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WINNING THE FLSA BATTLE: HOW 
CORPORATIONS USE ARBITRATION 
CLAUSES TO AVOID JUDGES, JURIES, 
PLAINTIFFS, AND LAWS 
JULIUS GETMAN† & DAN GETMAN‡ 
INTRODUCTION 
The two congressional statutes that most directly regulate 
labor relations are the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)1 
and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).2  Each of these 
statutes is based on the premise that working conditions should 
not be left to the market through unregulated individual 
contracts of employment.3  It was understood by Congress, in 
enacting these two statutes, that individually negotiated 
contracts would put workers at a significant bargaining 
disadvantage.4  Such contracts—drafted by the employer and 
enforced by it—are understood to reflect power and not the 
“meeting of minds” on which traditional contract law was based.  
The NLRA specifically states that the Act’s purpose is to achieve 
 
† Earl E. Sheffield Regents Chair, University of Texas School of Law. 
‡ Partner, Getman & Sweeney, PLLC. 
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006). 
2 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201–219 (West 2011). 
3 See E. Merrick Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941–
1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 321, 366 (1946) (“[A]ny minimum wage law is necessarily an 
assertion of a legislative policy against leaving wage determination to unregulated 
freedom of contract.”); see also Jonathan Fox Harris, Worker Unity and the Law: A 
Comparative Analysis of the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, and the Hope for the NLRA’s Future, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 107, 123 
(2009) (“While the NLRA contains procedural rights ‘essential to any effort to raise 
wages and improve working conditions beyond the minimums prescribed by law,’ the 
FLSA contains substantive rights that ‘set basic floors on workplace conditions.’ ” 
(citing JENNIFER LYNN GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR 
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 152 (2005))). 
4 See 29 U.S.C. § 151; see also Murray v. Noblesville Milling Co., 131 F.2d 470, 
473 (7th Cir. 1942) (“[T]he Act has two major purposes: (1) to reinforce employee 
bargaining power concerning hourly wages by prohibiting wage rates below a certain 
level, and (2) to reinforce employee bargaining power concerning hours of labor by 
exerting financial pressure upon the employer to limit hours to a certain level.”). 
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“equality of bargaining power between employers and employees” 
by “encouraging the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining.”5  The FLSA, because of “labor conditions 
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of 
living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of 
workers[,]” requires that contracts of employment conform to a 
series of Federal Standards.6 
Although it is inevitably difficult to offset bargaining-power 
imbalance through legislation, it is generally agreed that these 
statutes have played a significant role in upgrading the economic 
status and dignity of American workers.7  
In recent years, however, employers supported by Congress, 
and the Courts, have been able to chip away at the policies of 
both statutes.  The guarantees of the NLRA have been weakened 
as employers have learned to use the advantage that comes with 
management to defeat employee efforts at unionization and to 
render collective bargaining less effective and more dangerous for 
workers.  
I. FLSA BASICS 
As the NLRA has become less effective, the FLSA has 
become increasingly necessary to protect the working and living 
standards of employees.  But the FLSA has itself been rendered 
less effective through management manipulation.  Two 
significant illustrative areas of abuse are the garment and 
maritime industries.  In the domestic garment industry, foreign 
workers are often excluded from the protection of the FLSA by 
virtue of the system of subcontracting, which makes them 
employees of small, marginal employers, either not covered by 
the FLSA or unable to meet its requirements.8  In the maritime  
 
5 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
6 29 U.S.C. § 202. 
7 See, e.g., Daniel V. Yager & Sandra J. Boyd, Reinventing the Fair Labor 
Standards Act To Support the Reengineered Workplace, 11 LAB. LAW. 321, 323 (1996) 
(“The costs of failing to comply are significant. In fiscal year 1992 alone, the DOL 
assessed $142 million in damages for overtime violations and settled claims for 
another $119 million.”). 
8 See JULIUS GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS: IT TAKES A 
MOVEMENT (2010); see also Dennis Hayashi, Preventing Human Rights Abuses in the 
U.S. Garment Industry: A Proposed Amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 17 
YALE J. INT’L L. 195, 199 (1992). 
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industry, workers of U.S. ship owners can avoid the FLSA by 
flying flags of convenience.9  This simple technique renders U.S. 
seamen beyond the reach of U.S. law.10 
The FLSA is also often avoided by employers who structure 
employee job functioning to permit enough employer discretion to 
declare the employee an independent contractor.11  This 
technique is widespread.  It is particularly easy to use in 
situations such as cab driving—another occupation often staffed 
by immigrants—where close monitoring is almost impossible.  A 
new and possibly more effective technique for evading the FLSA 
has developed in recent years: the management-formulated 
arbitration clause that eliminates class and collective actions, 
which have been critical to the FLSA’s effectiveness.12 
II. FLSA ENFORCEMENT 
The FLSA is enforced by two primary mechanisms of 
investigation and enforcement action: the Department of Labor 
and private lawsuits.13  The United States Department of Labor 
(“USDOL”) has an investigative staff that conducts field audits 
and investigates complaints.14  USDOL also can bring 
enforcement actions on behalf of workers in federal court.15  But 
the Department of Labor handles only a portion of FLSA cases 
 
9 See generally R. Tali Epstein, Comment, Should the Fair Labor Standards Act 
Enjoy Extraterritorial Application?: A Look at the Unique Case of Flags of 
Convenience, 13 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 653 (1993). 
10 See id. at 672. 
11 See Jeanne M. Glader, A Harvest of Shame: The Imposition of Independent 
Contractor Status on Migrant Farmworkers and Its Ramifications for Migrant 
Children, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1455, 1456 (1991) (“By classifying workers . . . as 
independent contractors, . . . employers are able to avoid the expense and 
inconvenience of complying with worker protection provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act . . . .”). 
12 See, e.g., Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir. 2002). 
13 See Enforcement Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/screen74.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2012); see also 
29 U.S.C. § 218c(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (allowing employees to seek relief 
against employers they believe are in violation of the FLSA). 
14 29 U.S.C. § 211 (2006); U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., supra note 13. 
15 See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., supra note 13. 
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nationwide.16  The FLSA was enacted with the expectation that 
private attorneys would handle litigation for employees not paid 
the minimum wage.17  Currently, the FLSA is primarily enforced 
by legal action brought by affected individuals through class and 
collective actions.18 
Originally, FLSA claims were brought as class actions by 
unions on behalf of all their members.19  The Portal-to-Portal Act, 
passed by Congress in 1947,20 restricted the FLSA in at least two 
significant ways.  First, it restricted the hours that would be 
considered work.21  Second, and more importantly here, it 
 
16 DOL’s enforcement statistics for 2008 show that minimum wage claims 
handled by DOL averaged only $392 per worker, and overtime claims averaged only 
$676: 
  Violation Cases 
Back Wages 
Collected 
Percent 
of FLSA 
Back 
Wages 
Employees 
Receiving 
Back 
Wages 
Percent of 
Employees 
Receiving 
FLSA Back 
Wages 
Minimum 
Wage 10,085 $16,557,184 12% 42,199 21% 
Overtime 10,105 $123,686,617 88% 182,964 93% 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP’T STANDARDS ADMIN., WAGE & HOUR DIV., WAGE AND 
HOUR COLLECTS OVER $1.4 BILLION IN BACK WAGES FOR OVER 2 MILLION 
EMPLOYEES SINCE FISCAL YEAR 2001 (2008), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/ 
statistics/2008FiscalYear.pdf. 
17 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2010, 
tbl.4.4, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAnd 
Figures/2010/Table404.pdf: 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
 
FLSA 
filings in 
District 
Court 
 
4,207 
 
7,310 5,393 6,073 6,825 
 
29,808 
 
18 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (“An action to recover . . . may 
be maintained against any employer . . . by any one or more employees for and in 
behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.”). 
19 See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 676, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1060, 
1069 (1938) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) (“[S]uch employee or employees 
may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and in behalf 
of all employees similarly situated.”).  
20 Pub. L. No. 52, 61 Stat. 84, 84–89 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). 
21 Id. § 4, 61 Stat. at 86–87 (establishing that time spent traveling to and from 
work is non-compensable absent agreement to the contrary or the existence of a 
contrary custom or practice). 
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enacted the collective action procedures of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), 
removing the availability of class actions and imposing a 
distinctive procedure referred to as a “collective action.”22 
In collective actions each individual who wants to be part of 
a case must affirmatively opt in.23  This modification of the 
normal class action procedure—where individuals who do not 
wish to take part must affirmatively opt out—may seem slight, 
but the slight procedural hurdle has the significant effect of 
minimizing participation in FLSA actions.  Since employees must 
take affirmative steps to join the case, current employees are 
reluctant to join out of fear of retaliation.  The legal forms which 
must be filled out are confusing.24  Immigrant workers who may 
speak languages other than English and less-educated workers 
are likely to pass on the daunting forms.  Also, the mere practical 
burdens of filling out a form correctly, finding a stamp, and 
mailing it by deadlines all minimize participation rates.  In FLSA 
opt-in cases, the opt-in rate seldom tops thirty percent of the 
class.25  In typical opt-out class actions, the opt-out rate is very 
low, usually far less than one percent.26  Inertia seems to be the 
largest factor in determining participation.27  In collective 
actions, then, at most one-third of the affected workers will 
 
22 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see also Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The 
Origins of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 167 (1991) (outlining 
the procedural changes wrought by passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act). 
23 See Linder, supra note 22, at 167, 174.  
24 See Charlotte S. Alexander, Would an Opt In Requirement Fix the Class 
Action Settlement? Evidence from the Fair Labor Standards Act, 80 MISS. L.J. 443, 
471 (2010) (describing plaintiffs’ inability to read and comprehend complex legal 
language contained in opt-in notices). 
25 See, e.g., id. at 467–68 (using a case study based on opt-in rates in the 
Southern District of Florida as a proxy for nationwide opt-in rates and concluding 
that the average opt-in rate is fifteen percent); Andrew C. Brunsden, Hybrid Class 
Actions, Dual Certification, and Wage Law Enforcement in the Federal Courts, 29 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 269, 293–94 (2008) (analyzing 21 cases and concluding 
that the average opt-in rate in FLSA cases is 15.71%). 
26 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in 
Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 
1549 (2004). 
27 In practitioners’ experience, every additional practical step that is required to 
opt-in reduces the participation rate. For example, participation rates are 
incrementally higher with an easy to fill out opt-in form, self-addressed stamped or 
business reply mail, et cetera. For a comparative treatment of the impact of inertia 
in the FLSA opt-in context and in opt-out class actions, see Alexander, supra note 
24, at 469. 
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receive back pay and liquidated damages.28  The collective action 
process, with its drastic effect on the ultimate scope of relief, 
directly undercuts the FLSA’s remedial goal of making sure that 
all affected workers receive the minimum wage and overtime 
that the statute requires.29  Private FLSA attorneys frequently 
use state-law class actions in conjunction with FLSA collective 
actions to secure fuller relief to the affected class. 
III. STATE WAGE AND HOUR LAWS SHORE UP THE FLSA 
State wage and hour laws typically parallel the FLSA, 
providing minimum wages and overtime protections that largely 
duplicate the FLSA.30  State wage laws often supplement the 
FLSA by adding protections, such as guarantees that the 
promised wages will be paid; guarantees that deductions will not 
be taken from pay for the employers’ business expenses; higher 
minimum wages; spread-of-hours pay; break-time requirements; 
et cetera.31  Federal courts in districts around the country have 
allowed Rule 23 opt-out classes under supplemental jurisdiction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 See id. at 484 (identifying the impact of opt-in rules on overall plaintiff 
recoveries); see also Brunsden, supra note 25, at 298 (describing the implications of 
the opt-in regime for the efficacy of FLSA enforcement). 
29 The congressional purpose behind the Portal-to-Portal Act’s opt-in provision 
(crafted in 1947) was concern that disinterested parties and unions were bringing 
actions in which employees might not wish to participate. See Hoffmann-La Roche 
Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989). 
30 Brunsden, supra note 25, at 279.  
31 See id.  
FINAL_Getman  Getman (Do Not Delete) 2/21/2013  11:50 AM 
2012] WINNING THE FLSA BATTLE 453 
 
to tag along with opt-in FLSA collective actions.32  Almost all 
jurisdictions, except those in the Third Circuit,33 have certified 
state wage and hour class actions along with collective actions.   
The effectiveness of FLSA and state wage and hour cases is 
tied to the combination of collective and class actions that 
facilitate suits on behalf of workers whose individual claims 
would not normally justify the expenses of a lawsuit.  Individual 
minimum wage claims are typically small damages cases.  For 
example, if an employee is cheated out of $2 per hour, that sum 
represents nearly one-third of a minimum wage earner’s yearly 
income.  Yet few lawyers will bring a claim that might take 
$50,000 to $200,000 to litigate in federal court, only to collect a 
few thousand dollars in damages.  And the courts are frequently 
 
32 See, e.g., Lindsay v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the difference between FLSA and state law class actions did not 
prohibit supplemental jurisdiction over state claims); Sjoblom v. Charter Commc’ns, 
LLC, No. 3:07-CV-0451-BBC, 2007 WL 4560541, at *5–6 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 19, 2007); 
Freeman v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., No. 07-1503 (JLL), 2007 WL 4440875, at *2 
(D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2007) (denying a motion to dismiss based on the argument that the 
class action claim is inherently incompatible with the FMLA collective action claim 
and instead conducting supplemental jurisdiction analysis); Salazar v. 
AgriProcessors, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 873, 879–80 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (excluding legal 
doctrine of inherent incompatibility within supplemental jurisdiction test); 
Silverman v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., Nos. CV 06-7272 DSF(CTx), CV 07-2601-
DSF(CTx), 2007 WL 3072274, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2007); Lehman v. Legg 
Mason, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 726, 731 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (denying motion to dismiss 
class claims because hybrid cases do not create impermissible conflict with 
congressional intent); Marquez v. Partylite Worldwide, Inc., No. 07 C 2024, 2007 WL 
2461667, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2007); Brickey v. Dolencorp, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 176, 
179 (W.D.N.Y. 2007); Westerfield v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. 06-CV-2817, 2007 WL 
2162989, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2007) (collecting cases); Bamonte v. City of Mesa, 
No. CV 06-01860-PHX-NVW, 2007 WL 2022011, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 10, 2007); Cryer 
v. InterSolutions, Inc., No. 06-2032 (EGS), 2007 WL 1191928, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 
2007) (allowing a hybrid class collective because “there is even greater cause for 
concern about confusion of class members if the state law claims proceed in a 
separate court and class members thereby receive class action notices from two 
different courts”); Lee v. ABC Carpet & Home, 236 F.R.D. 193, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Mascol v. E & L Transp., Inc., No. CV-03-3343 CPS, 2005 WL 1541045, at *3 
(E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2005); Velez v. Majik Cleaning Serv., Inc., No. 03 Civ 8698(SAS), 
2005 WL 106895, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2005); Smellie v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 
03Civ.0805(LTS)(DFE), 2004 WL 2725124, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2004); Noble v. 
93 Univ. Place Corp., 224 F.R.D. 330, 340–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Ansoumana v. 
Gristede’s Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
33 De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 311 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining 
that, because state class claims generally predominate over federal collective actions 
due to different class sizes and inconsistency with congressional purpose, state 
claims should be dismissed in federal court). 
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known to reduce attorney fees that are disproportionate to the 
underlying claim award.34  Moreover, even collective actions on 
behalf of scores of workers will often yield damages funds of 
small enough sums that private attorneys risk receiving reduced 
fees due to the courts’ proportionality concerns.  Class actions are 
thus critical to FLSA enforcement, as they represent the only 
effective means for extending minimum wage and overtime 
protections to the bulk of the workforce.   
But the ability of FLSA plaintiffs in the future to band 
together to make the Act effective has been put into doubt by two 
recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”).35 
IV. STOLT-NIELSEN AND CLASS ARBITRATION 
The first of these cases, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp.,36 involved the construction of a general 
arbitration clause that did not specifically mention class actions.  
A panel of arbitrators construed the clause to authorize a class-
wide action.37  Its ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, but reversed by the Supreme Court on the 
ground that the arbitrators’ decision was not based on 
interpretation of the agreement.38  The Court did not return the 
case to the arbitrator for a more specific determination.39  It 
interpreted the agreement itself, concluding that “there c[ould] 
be only one possible outcome on the facts before [it]”:  “[T]he 
parties c[ould not] be compelled” to participate in a class action.40  
 
 
34 See, e.g., U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 413–15 
(2d Cir. 1989); Thompson v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 664 F. 
Supp. 578, 582–85 (D.D.C. 1987). 
35 The Supreme Court resolved any doubts about whether the FAA applied to 
FLSA claims in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., an Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”) case. See 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The ADEA and FLSA share 
the same procedural enforcement mechanism of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006 & Supp. II 
2008). 500 U.S. at 26, 28–29; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625–26, 640 (1985) (arbitrations of statutory claims 
approved). 
36 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
37 Id. 1765–66. 
38 Id. at 1766–67, 1775–76. 
39 Id. at 1770. 
40 Id. at 1770, 1776. 
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The Court’s opinion took arbitration experts by surprise.41  
For many years arbitrators have been permitted by the Supreme 
Court to interpret both collective and adhesive agreements to 
reflect notions of fair play and administrative convenience.  But 
in Stolt-Nielsen, the Court, following a very different approach, 
was unwilling to accept an arbitrator’s interpretation of an 
agreement without specific contractual language authorizing 
class-wide relief.42  The opinion either reflected a new, more 
stringent standard of review of arbitral decisions or else was a 
reflection of the Court majority’s dislike of class actions.  The 
latter interpretation seems by far the most persuasive.  
As Alan Scott Rau states in his recently published article, 
Arbitral Power and The Limits of Contract: The New Trilogy43: 
One would have to invest a good deal of time and effort before 
being able to identify cases—which in the end amount only to a 
trivial number—in which the Supreme Court has been willing 
to mandate or approve the annulment of an arbitral award.  
(And before now these have been strictly outliers, grounded 
either on the lack of any agreement at all, or on some 
impropriety in the composition of the arbitral tribunal).  But 
then we come to Stolt-Nielsen:  It can hardly be accidental that 
the specter of class relief in arbitration is just about the only 
feature of the arbitration process that has been anathema to the 
business community—or that this rare decision restrictive of 
arbitral power happens, wonder of wonders, to be one in which a 
business-oriented court manages more or less to relieve it of any 
such anxiety.44 
V. AT&T MOBILITY LLC V. CONCEPCION 
The Supreme Court’s dislike of class actions and its concern 
for the interests of business enterprises was revealed even more 
clearly in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.45  In that case, the 
 
41 See, e.g., John Elwood, After Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.: Deciding 
When Class Arbitration Is Permissible, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 27, 2010, 
5:35 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/04/27/after-stolt-nielsen-v-animalfeeds-intl-corp-
deciding-when-class-arbitration-is-permissible/. 
42 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775–76. 
43 Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract: The New Trilogy, 
22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 435 (2011) (footnotes omitted). 
44  Id. at 484–85.  
45 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
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plaintiffs sued AT&T as part of a class action for fraud.46  The 
contract they had signed with AT&T provided that all disputes 
between the parties were to be arbitrated, but that any claims 
must be brought in the parties’ “individual capacit[ies], and not 
as . . . plaintiff[s] or class member[s] in any purported class or 
representative proceeding.”47  The contract was entered into in 
California.48  The federal district court in which the case was 
brought refused to enforce the arbitration clause on the grounds 
that it was unconscionable under California law.49  The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.50  Both the district court 
and the Ninth Circuit found the arbitration clause invalid under 
California law.51  Class action waivers in California are governed 
by the Discover Bank rule,52 according to which they are 
unconscionable when it is  
found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which 
disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve 
small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party 
with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to 
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money . . . .53   
The Supreme Court held that the California rule of 
unconscionability was preempted by the Federal Arbitration 
Act.54   
Upholding a contract deemed unconscionable under 
California law required something of a stretch, even for Justice 
Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion, since the Arbitration Act 
provides that arbitration agreements may be unenforceable 
“upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.”55  Unconscionability would seem to be precisely 
the sort of rule that the Act permits states to apply.  But the 
Court majority concluded that the California rule unduly 
 
46 Id. at 1744. 
47 Id. 
48 See id. at 1744–45.  
49 Id. at 1745. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), superseded by 
statute as stated in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
53 Id. at 1110. 
54 131 S. Ct. at 1753.  
55 Id. at 1744.  
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conflicted with the fundamental policy of the Arbitration Act “to 
ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to 
their terms”:56  “Requiring the availability of classwide 
arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration 
and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”57  
Further, Justice Scalia argued, that the California rule is 
indistinguishable from other rules that might more clearly be 
inconsistent with the FAA, such as one finding unconscionable 
“arbitration agreements that fail to provide for judicially 
monitored discovery” or one that disallows “agreements that fail 
to abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence.”58  Nor was the 
Discover Bank Rule saved by the requirement that the damages 
be “predictably small.”59  Justice Scalia declared that the 
“requirement, however, is toothless and malleable.”60   
Much of the majority opinion is devoted to demonstrating 
that class-wide arbitration is an undesirable process:  
Classwide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating 
additional and different procedures and involving higher stakes.  
Confidentiality becomes more difficult.  And while it is 
theoretically possible to select an arbitrator with some expertise 
relevant to the class-certification question, arbitrators are not 
generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural 
aspects of certification, such as the protection of absent parties.  
The conclusion follows that class arbitration, to the extent it is 
manufactured by Discover Bank rather than consensual, is 
inconsistent with the FAA.   
First, the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices 
the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and 
makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to 
generate procedural morass than final judgment.61 
Justice Scalia’s concern with the problem of finding an 
arbitrator competent to deal with a complex legal issue is a 
 
56 Id. at 1748. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1747. 
59 Id. at 1750.  
60 Id. It would be relatively easy for a court to distinguish class action bars from 
the other agreements that Scalia mentions on the grounds of their impact on the 
basic statutory right being litigated. Any concept of “small damages” seems far 
easier to define and apply than such legal terms as “restraint of trade,” “concerted 
activities,” or “free exercise of religion.” 
61 Id. at 1750–51.  
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significant departure from recent Court precedent and opinions, 
which have brushed off concerns with arbitral competence in 
complex legal areas such as anti-trust and employment 
discrimination.62  Although the American Arbitration Association 
(“AAA”) has been administering class actions for some time, 
without ill effect, the Court’s opinion cites no evidence of 
incompetence, and the longer process in class arbitrations is 
compared only with bilateral arbitration—as the dissent points 
out—and not with class actions in court.63  The clear concern of 
the majority is that class actions burden employers.  No one 
would deny that employer-drafted arbitration clauses are likely 
to be streamlined and efficient to the extent that they strip 
plaintiffs of procedural rights and allow corporations to craft 
procedures more to their liking.  Justice Scalia does not discuss 
whether they are likely to achieve justice for consumers or 
workers or whether they utterly restrict the remedial schemes 
that Congress or state statutes intended.64   
The lower court opinions that Justice Scalia overruled in the 
Concepcion case permitted class actions presided over by a judge 
and not by an arbitrator.65  He does not address the similarities 
and differences between the two.66  Most of the problems that he 
associates with arbitral class actions are also problems when a 
judge presides, which suggests that his opposition is to class 
actions, however they are adjudicated.  Employers aware of the 
decision are very likely to create their own clauses limiting class 
actions and imposing other requirements on the arbitration 
process.  
To those of us concerned with the rights of employees, the 
opinion is deeply disturbing.  Justice Scalia states the purpose of 
the Arbitration Act as “to ensure the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements according to their terms.”67  This formulation 
enshrines employer dictates as supreme and strikes any 
counterbalancing state-limiting doctrine such as 
 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1751.  
64 Id. at 1748–50. 
65 Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05 CV 1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, 
at *14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 
S. Ct. 3322 (2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
66 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745, 1753.  
67 Id. at 1748.  
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unconscionability, which under section 2 of the FAA had 
previously been applicable.68  Thus, even rules that come within 
the terms of section 2’s “grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract” are almost certain to be 
inconsistent with the arbitration clauses yet to be written by 
corporations in the context of adhesive contracts set free by this 
opinion.69  Justice Scalia reads the Arbitration Act as a 
sanctification of adhesion contracts which he regularly attributes 
to “the parties” even though one party had no voice in its 
framing.70  
By treating contracts of adhesion as representing the desire 
of “the parties” and by interpreting the Arbitration Act to insist 
on following their terms, no matter what Congress or state 
legislatures have limited, Justice Scalia has made a broad grant 
of power to employers.  The Concepcion case suggests that any 
employer-imposed procedures will be enforced as expressing the 
will of “the parties.”71  An employer can make the entire 
proceeding confidential, insist on or reject the use of a jury, limit 
discovery, and in any other way structure the process to its 
liking.  Currently, companies lace arbitration agreements with 
clauses that shorten statutes of limitation, limit remedies, bar 
joinder, and set fees for the complainant.  There is no suggestion 
of a limiting principle anywhere in Concepcion.72  If an 
arbitration agreement required a complainant to dress in purple, 
sing the star spangled banner, and shout “Heil!” to the company 
before bringing a claim, one wonders if the Court would insist 
that the agreement be “enforced according to [its] terms,” as a 
reflection of the agreement of the parties.73  If not, on what 
grounds would the Court reject it?  The Concepcion decision 
permits employers to ban class actions against themselves 
 
68 See id. at 1753. 
69 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
70 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744, 1750 n.6. 
71 Id. at 1748–49. 
72 Justice Scalia does suggest that the legislature might help workers and 
consumers by “requiring class-action-waiver provisions in adhesive arbitration 
agreements to be highlighted.” Id. at 1750 n.6. Even this minimal concession is 
followed immediately with the warning that “[s]uch steps cannot, however, conflict 
with the FAA or frustrate its purpose to ensure that private arbitration agreements 
are enforced according to their terms.” Id.  
73 Id. 
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through the use of an arbitration clause—a startlingly 
exculpatory effect—but its impact is likely to be even greater.74  
This approach represents a return to 1920s master and 
servant law, where a company’s unilateral decisions were 
understood to represent the benevolent workings of the market.  
It is the enshrinement of Chicago School economics, the very 
approach rejected by our labor laws. 
To the extent that contracts requiring individual arbitration 
of employment claims become universal, as they are on their way 
to becoming, the FLSA, which is based on distrust of employer-
imposed contract terms, becomes increasingly ineffective.  
VI. UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FLSA AND STATE 
WAGE CLAIMS 
While it does not require special prognostication skills to 
know how Justice Scalia will rule on the questions of class and 
collective action waivers in FLSA cases, the entire Court’s 
answer to those questions are uncertain at present.75  It seems 
likely that even waivers of collective action rights will be 
affirmed in arbitration, given that anything interfering with an 
employer’s incentive to use arbitration is to be stricken under the 
Scalia analysis.76  If so, the Concepcion decision will even expand 
the restrictions of the Portal-to-Portal Act limitations prohibiting 
class-wide relief through the impediment of collective actions.  
The AAA currently administratively refuses to accept collective 
action arbitration complaints—unless the arbitration agreement 
clearly permits them, or they are mandated by the Court—
though it permits an arbitrator to rule that collective actions are 
permissible, notwithstanding a waiver, once an individual 
demand has been filed.77  
 
74 Exculpatory class action bans have generally been prohibited by courts 
outside of the arbitration process. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 
F.3d 300, 304, 312, 317 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated sub nom., 30 S. Ct. 2401 (2010). 
75 Justice Thomas’s concurring decision, based upon an entirely different 
statutory analysis, suggests that the Court could reach a different result in a 
different case. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753–54 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
76 See, e.g., Simpkins v. Pulte Home Corp., No. 6:08-cv-130-Orl-19DAB, 2008 WL 
3927275, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2008) (holding that the FLSA collective action 
procedure was trumped by “public policy in favor of arbitration”). 
77 See AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations, AM. ARB. ASS’N (July 14, 2005), 
http://www.adr.org/Classarbitrationpolicy. 
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There are reasons to think that arbitrators or the courts may 
find that collective action waivers are legally impermissible.78  
The courts and the Department of Labor have long held that 
FLSA rights may not be waived by employees.79 
And there is a strong argument to the effect that an 
employer who demands a class or collective action waiver of 
employees is committing an unfair labor practice, under the well-
established doctrine that such waivers are per se interference 
with concerted activity.80  The ability of employers to unilaterally 
insulate themselves from class and collective actions through 
self-serving contract provisions has recently been rejected by the 
National Labor Relations Board in D.R. Horton.81  In that case, 
the Board reaffirmed its earlier holding that “the NLRA protects 
employees’ ability to join together to pursue workplace 
grievances, including through litigation.”82  The Board majority 
pointed out that “collective efforts to redress workplace wrongs or 
improve workplace conditions are at the core of what Congress 
intended to protect by adopting the broad language of Section 7.” 
83  In its careful, well-reasoned opinion, the Board sought to 
reconcile the NLRA with the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Concepcion by permitting employers to limit class arbitration but 
not to combine that limitation with a limitation on class action 
litigation.84  It concluded that “employers may not compel 
employees to waive their NLRA right to collectively pursue 
litigation of employment claims in all forums, arbitral and 
judicial.”85  The Board’s reasoning in D.R. Horton is careful and 
compelling.  It permits employment contracts that waive class 
action arbitrations, but it makes that option far less appealing to 
employers.  If accepted by the courts, the D.R. Horton holding 
will significantly reduce the potential damage to employee rights 
 
78 See, e.g., Raniere v. Citigroup Inc., No. 11 Civ. 2448, 2011 WL 5881926, *15–
17 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2011). 
79 See, e.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706–07 (1945); FLSA 
Hours Worked Advisor: Collective Bargaining Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,  
http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/hoursworked/screen1c.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 
2012).  
80 See D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. 184, 2, 3, 5–6, 21, 23–24 (2012). 
81 Id. at 1.  
82 Id. at 2. 
83 Id. at 3. 
84 Id. at 11–16. 
85 Id. at 12. 
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contained in the Concepcion opinion—though it will not affect the 
Concepcion decision’s effect on consumer cases and other non-
employment issues.  And while there have been precious few 
arbitrations which have implemented the FLSA’s collective 
action process through a notice routinely used by the federal 
courts, at least one arbitrator has done so and that decision was 
approved upon review by the district court.86 
Ultimately, the most significant question that remains 
undecided by the Supreme Court is whether arbitration clauses 
that act as exculpatory clauses permitting a corporation to 
violate statutory rights with impunity will be condemned by any 
principle rooted in the substantive statutes’ remedial purposes.  
The Supreme Court’s vacatur of the Second Circuit’s decision,87 
holding that exculpatory class waivers in arbitration clauses are 
prohibited, is ominous.  In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant,88  the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the 
Second Circuit’s decision striking a class action waiver as 
exculpatory even before the Concepcion decision, “for further 
consideration in light of Stolt-Nielsen.”89  Given that the decision 
bore no relation to the holding in Stolt-Nielsen, the vacatur 
perhaps illustrated that the Supreme Court intended to grant the 
decision—and the more expansive Concepcion case—unlimited 
effect.90 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s arbitration decisions provide employers 
with a road map for gutting the remaining effectiveness of basic 
labor protections such as the FLSA, which have provided 
protections against employer abuse since the 1930s.  The Court’s 
rulings enshrine corporate power, expressed in adhesive 
 
86 Veliz v. Cintas Corp., No. C 03-1180 RGS (SBA), 2009 WL 1766691, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. June 22, 2009). 
87 In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 320 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated 
sub nom., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010). 
88 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010). 
89 Id. 
90 Compare Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 
(2010) (“[A] party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration 
unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”), 
with In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 F.3d at 320 (“[T]he class action 
waiver . . . cannot be enforced in this case because to do so would grant Amex de 
facto immunity from antitrust liability . . . .”). 
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contracts applicable to consumers and employees, as “the will of 
the parties,” and this will is now held to override the remedial 
purposes implicit in state statutory causes of action such as state 
wage and hour laws which are designed to limit the “freedom of 
contract.”  The future looks dim for workers and their advocates 
unless the Court changes its approach. 
 
